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Abstract
The well-being of agents is often directly affected by their beliefs, in the form of anticipatory
feelings such as anxiety and hopefulness. Economists have tried to model this effect by introducing
beliefs as arguments in decision makers’ vNM utility function. One might expect that such a model
would be capable of explaining anomalous attitudes to information that we observe in reality. We
show that the model has several shortcomings in this regard, as long as Bayesian updating is retained.
© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: B41; D81; D01
1. Introduction
In standard expected utility theory, decision makers have preferences over some set
of consequences, where a consequence consists of a state of nature and an action taken
by the decision maker (DM henceforth). The DM’s beliefs regarding the state of nature
clearly affect his decisions, but they are not part of the deﬁnition of a consequence—that
is, they do not enter as arguments into his vNM utility function. In other words, the DM is
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“emotionally neutral” towards his beliefs. In reality, however, our well-being often seems
to be directly affected by our beliefs. For instance, imagine that you expect the results of a
medical test. Even if this information cannot lead to any change in your actions, it causes
you to update your beliefs. The change in beliefs may affect your well-being by increasing
or reducing your level of anxiety.
For this reason, there has been a growing sentiment among economists that the standard
model of choice under uncertainty should be enriched by adding beliefs to the description
of consequences, in order to capture anticipatory feelings such as anxiety or hopefulness.
Speciﬁcally, economists have constructed expected-utility choice models, in which the
DM’s belief (in addition to his action and the state of nature) is an argument in his vNM
utility function. The following quote is taken from Akerlof and Dickens (1982), probably
the ﬁrst paper to construct such an extended choice model:
“...personsnotonlyhavepreferencesoverstatesoftheworld,butalsoovertheirbeliefs
about the state of the world ...persons have some control over their beliefs; not only are
people able to exercise some choice about belief given available information, they can
also manipulate their own beliefs by selecting sources of information likely to conﬁrm
‘desired’ beliefs.”
As Akerlof and Dickens point out, people inﬂuence their beliefs in two ways: direct
choice of beliefs through ‘self persuasion’, and indirect choice through selection of signals.
In this paper, we focus on the latter mechanism: we are concerned with the effect of agents’
“preferences over their beliefs about the state of the world” on the way in which they
“select sources of information.” Speciﬁcally, we study the choices of signals by a DM
whose behavior is governed by the above-mentioned, extended expected-utility model. At
the same time, we exclude direct choice of beliefs. Our DM updates his beliefs according
to Bayes’ rule given available information.
Severalstudiesinmedicineandpsychologyhaveconﬁrmedthatindividualswhobelieve
that an unpleasant event is likely to occur may reject information regarding this event, even
when this information may help them take actions that reduce the unpleasantness of the
anticipated event. For example, Lerman et al. (1998) demonstrated that 46% of subjects
whose blood was tested for genetic mutations refused to receive the test results despite the
fact that the test results indicated whether or not these subjects were susceptible to breast
cancer later in life.
We pose the following question: can an enriched expected utility model, in which a
Bayesian DM’s belief is an argument in his vNM utility function, explain anomalous
choices of information sources that the usual expected utility model cannot explain? To
study this problem, we construct in Section 3 a model with a ﬁnite set Ω of states of na-
ture. The DM’s prior belief is a probability distribution p over the state space. He obtains
information about the state by observing a signal Q, which is modeled as a ﬁnite stochastic
matrix (the element qij in the matrix is the probability of realization j of the signal, given
that the true state is i). For each prior p, the DM is assumed to have a complete preference
ordering p over the set of all signals. The preference proﬁle (p)p∈Δ(Ω) constitutes the
DM’s “attitude to information.”
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• A patient prefers more accurate medical tests when he is relatively certain of being
healthy, yet he avoids such tests when he is relatively certain of being ill.
• A manager consults his advisors when he is relatively sure of what their advice will
be, yet avoids their advice when he is relatively unsure.
• A news reader prefers a newspaper with a left-wing bias (i.e., one that reports every
piece of news that supports a leftist view, but not all the news that support a right-
ist view) to an objective, fully informative newspaper. He also prefers the latter to a
newspaper with a right-wing bias.
These attitudes to information are anomalous, in the sense that a standard expected
utility maximizer (whose beliefs do not enter into his vNM utility function) would never
display them. Our intuition suggests that in these examples, the DM approaches informa-
tion not as a means of making better decisions, but rather as a means of cultivating desired
beliefs and suppressing undesired beliefs. The patient in the ﬁrst example is afraid of learn-
ing that the state is adverse. The manager in the second example and the news reader in the
third example fear the prospect of having to change their opinion.
How can we accommodate this intuition in the extended expected-utility model? Be-
cause our DM is Bayesian, a prior p and a signal Q induce a probability distribution
over the DM’s posterior belief, via Bayes’ formula. An attitude to information is consis-
tent with expected utility maximization over beliefs if there is a continuous vNM utility
function over posteriors u:Δ(Ω) → R, such that the DM evaluates signals by the ex-
pected utility from the induced lottery over posteriors. For example, let Ω ={ ω1,ω2}.
At the prior (p1,p2), the DM prefers a fully informative binary signal (q11 = q22 = 1,
q12 = q21 = 0) to a fully uninformative binary signal (qij = 1/2 for every i,j = 1,2) if
p1 · u(1,0) + p2 · u(0,1)>u ( p 1,p2). Note that u is deﬁned only over posterior beliefs,
ignoring the actions that the DM may take after observing the signal. We show that this is
without loss of generality.
Despite its apparent intuitive appeal, the model of expected utility from posterior be-
liefs (with Bayesian updating) turns out to have several shortcomings as an explanation of
anomalous attitudes to information. We make this argument via two sets of results.
A difﬁculty with ordinal utility representation. Recall Dickens and Akerlof’s intuitive
claim that people tend to select sources of information that are likely to conﬁrm “de-
sired” beliefs. It seems reasonable to suppose that people who fundamentally disagree
about the relative desirability of different states would also differ in their preferences over
information sources. Nevertheless, in Section 4 we show that there are non-monotonic
transformations of the vNM function u, which represent the same preference proﬁle. Two
people with opposite views regarding the relative desirability of states may share the same
attitude to information. Thus, the distinction between “desired” and “undesired” beliefs is
not relevant to the DM’s choice of information sources.
Failure to explain anomalies. We examine whether anomalous attitudes to information,
such as those described in the above examples, can be explained by expected utility maxi-
mization over posterior beliefs. In Section 5 we show that despite the intuition that these
types of behavior are a consequence of anticipatory feelings, they are inconsistent with the
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The results are simple from a technical point of view. We believe that they are import-
ant because they demonstrate the limitations of the extended expected-utility framework
as a model of anticipatory feelings. We identify three ways to proceed from these negative
results, while retaining the idea of direct utility from posterior beliefs: (i) abandoning ex-
pected utility in favor of non-expected utility functionals; (ii) incorporating the DM’s prior
belief as an additional argument in his vNM utility function; (iii) abandoning Bayesian
updating. In Section 6 we provide several arguments for the third option.
2. Related literature
The earliest work that we know of, in which an agent’s belief enters into his utility
function, is Akerlof and Dickens (1982). In the works that followed their example, one can
distinguish between models in which the agent’s belief is a choice variable and models
in which it is a parameter in his utility function. While Akerlof and Dickens (1982) falls
into the former category, our paper falls into the latter. In all the models that we are aware
of, DMs have expected-utility preferences over a space of outcomes, whose description
consists of the DM’s belief, his action and the true state of nature.
The former strand of the literature includes Brunnermeier and Parker (2002) and Yariv
(2002), who construct multi-period choice models, in which agents directly choose their
beliefs. In both models, a DM’s periodic utility is a sum of two components: the usual,
“physical” utility from the DM’s action and the true state of nature, and a non-standard
“anticipation utility” or “belief utility,” which is a function of the DM’s present and past
beliefs. In both models, choosing to hold an incorrect belief may be advantageous because
it is a “desirable” belief. However, the DM is constrained to choose an action which is
optimal w.r.t. his belief, such that holding an incorrect belief is costly in terms his phys-
ical utility. The two papers use very different speciﬁcations of the “non-standard” utility
component and apply their models to different realms of choice behavior. In particular,
Brunnermeier and Parker (2002) deal with inter-temporal consumption behavior and do
not study information acquisition, whereas in Yariv (2002), the DM receives a signal every
period and he can choose its accuracy level. In another paper, Eyster (2002) models DMs
who choose beliefs that help them to rationalize their past choices.
The most important difference between these papers and the present paper is that in
our model, the DM cannot choose beliefs directly and can only inﬂuence them indirectly
through his choice of signals. Our objective is to examine the implications of belief-
dependent vNM utility on attitudes to information, whereas the above-cited papers focus
on the trade-off between the physical costs and emotional beneﬁts of choosing to hold an
incorrect belief.
Our paper is more directly related to the second strand in the literature, in which a DM’s
belief is not a choice variable, but a parameter whose value is determined in equilibrium.
Caplin andLeahy(2001)developa two-periodmodel,in whichthe DM’sﬁrst periodutility
is a function of the ﬁrst period outcome and his posterior ﬁrst-period probability distribu-
tion over second-period outcomes. K˝ ozsegi (2004b) enriches this model by studying the
T -period decision problem in which the DM’s expectations over outcomes in each of the
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The Caplin–Leahy model has found some interesting health economics applications.
K˝ ozsegi (2003) examinesits implicationsfor the way patients request medical information.
Caplin and Leahy (2004) study the problem faced by a physician who observes the health
state of a patient (which can be either “good” or “bad”) and needs to decide whether or
not to credibly reveal that state. The physician wishes to maximize the patient’s expected
utility, knowing that the patient’s posterior belief about his health state enters his utility
function.Therearetwotypesofpatients:onewhoprefershisposteriorbeliefstobeasclose
as possible to his prior, and another with the opposite preference. Assuming the physician
only knows the distribution of patients’ types, the authors analyze the equilibrium of the
extensivegame(usingasolutionconceptdevelopedbyGeanakopolosetal.,1989)inwhich
a patient ﬁrst announces his type, and then the physician decides whether or not to reveal
the patient’s health state.1
Both K˝ ozsegi (2003) and Caplin and Leahy (2004) use a model of expected utility over
beliefs to explain anomalous attitudes to information, while retaining Bayesian updating
as part of the solution concept they apply. Our paper can be viewed as a critique of the
modeling practice employed by these papers (we discuss the relation between our results
and these papers in Sections 4 and 5).
Our paper is also related to the literature that studies attitudes to temporal resolution
of uncertainty, emanating from Kreps and Porteus (1978). Although our model is static, it
may be possible to embed it in the Kreps–Porteus formalism. A DM who systematically
prefers more (less) accurate signals in a static model, can be viewed as a DM who system-
atically prefers early (late) resolution of uncertainty in a multi-period model. We have no
disagreement with this “embedding” argument. To the extent that preferences over beliefs
can be re-interpreted as preferences over the timing of uncertainty resolution, our results
apply to the Kreps–Porteus formalism.2
Decision theorists have studied anomalous attitudes to information and sought to trace
them to other sources than anticipatory feelings. As demonstrated by Wakker (1988), Safra
and Sulganik (1995) and Grant et al. (1998, 2000), DMs’ violation of the independence
axiom may cause them to dislike information. In these papers, preferences are deﬁned over
lotteries and utility is deﬁned over physical consequences; attitudes to information are
deduced from these preferences. In contrast, the present paper redeﬁnes the consequence
space to be the set of posterior beliefs, while adhering to an expected-utility functional;
attitudes to information are not deduced, but serve as choice primitives.
Finally, anomalous attitudes to information have also been explained by dynamically
inconsistentpreferences.AsshownbyCarrilloandMariotti(2000)andBénabouandTirole
(2002), a decision maker who lacks self control may decide to avoid information today so
as to discipline his future self.
1 K˝ ozsegi (2004a) extends this model by allowing physicians to send non-veriﬁable messages, as well as by
allowing patients to visit more than one physician.
2 In a recent paper, Caplin and Eliaz (2003) study a mechanism design problem where agents have preferences
for late resolution of uncertainty. In their model, the payoff function of each agent depends on the posterior
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3. The model
There is a ﬁnite set of states Ω ={ ω1,...,ωn}.L e tΔ(Ω) denote the set of all probabil-
ity distributions on the elements of Ω. A DM has a vector of prior probabilities on Ω given
by p ∈ Δ(Ω) where pi is the prior probability assigned to state ωi.Asignal is a random
variable, which can take m  n distinct values, s1,...,sm. A signal is characterized by an
n × m stochastic matrix of conditional probabilities denote by Q = (qij)i=1,...,n;j=1,...,m,
where qij ∈[ 0,1] is the probability of observing the realization sj conditional on the state
being ωi. Of course, for every i = 1,...,n,

j=1,...,mqij = 1. With slight abuse of termi-
nology, we refer to a matrix Q as a signal and let Q denote the set of all signals, i.e., the
set of all n×m stochastic matrices. Note that although we assume that m  n, it is always
possible to replicate signals with k<mrealizations, by setting m−k +1r o w si nQ to be
identical.
The DM’s choice of signals at every prior p is rational. Therefore, the DM’s overall
attitude to information can be summarized by a proﬁle of preference relations (p)p∈Δ(Ω)
over the set Q. We are agnostic as to whether the DM has to take some action after observ-
ing a signal’s realization. We offer a justiﬁcation for this modeling choice below.
To illustrate the concept of a preference proﬁle over signals, consider the case of n = 2.
For ease of exposition, we write Q  R for Q,R ∈ Q if q11  r11 and q22  r22 (and we
write Q > R if at least one of these inequalities is strict).
Example 1. An information-seeking DM prefers a signal Q to a signal R whenever Q is
more accurate than R. In particular, for every prior p ∈ Δ(Ω), Q > R implies Q  p R.
Similarly, an information-averse DM satisﬁes the opposite property: for every prior p ∈
(0,1)2, Q > R implies R  p Q.3
Example 2. Consider a patient, for whom ω1 and ω2 stand for “being healthy” and “being
ill,” respectively. The patient seeks information when he is relatively sure that he is healthy,
yetheavoidsinformationwhenheisrelativelysurethatheisill.Formally,whenp1 isclose
to 1, Q > R implies Q  p R; and when p1 is close to 0, Q > R implies R  p Q.
Example 3. A manager seeks the opinion of his employees only when he is sufﬁciently
certain that the new information will not cause him to change his view as to which state
is more probable. Formally, when max{p1,p2} is close to 1, Q > R implies Q  p R; and
when max{p1,p2} is close to 1/2, Q > R implies R  p Q.
Example 4. A student is writing a PhD thesis. There are two possible states of the world:
either the thesis is of low quality (state ω1) or it is of high quality (state ω2). The student
can choose among three thesis advisors. An “objective” advisor always tells his students
the truth. A “lenient” advisor tells his students that their thesis is of high quality whenever
it is in fact of high quality. However, even if a thesis is of low quality, he claims that it is
3 Note that the relation Q > R is incomplete, hence the example does not fully specify p.F o rt h es a k eo ft h i s
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of high quality with probability 1−α. A “tough” advisor tells his students that their thesis
is of low quality whenever it is in fact of low quality. However, even if a thesis is of high
quality, he claims that it is of low quality with probability 1 − α. Our student ranks the
objective advisor below the lenient advisor and above the tough advisor, as long as α is
sufﬁciently close to one.
Example 5. After observing the realization of a signal, the DM has to take some action.
Each state is associated with some optimal action; failure to take it entails a loss. The
DM chooses his action so as to maximize expected utility from physical outcomes. We
refer to this DM as an EUM agent. Suppose that p1  = 1/2. When the probability pairs
(q11,q22) and (r11,r22) are sufﬁciently close to (1/2,1/2), the DM’s optimal choice of
action is independent of the signals’ realizations; hence, the DM is indifferent between Q
and R. As the signal becomes more informative, it begins to affect the DM’s choice of
action and his expected loss decreases. For example, suppose that there are two actions,
a1 and a2. For every i = 1,2, the utility values from taking actions ai and aj (i  = j)
at state ωi are 0 and −1, respectively. Thus, the DM faces a decision problem with a
symmetric loss function. It follows that whenever p1 > 1/2 and Q  R we have that Q p
R if p1/(1−p1)  q22/(1−q11) and Q  p R if p1/(1−p1)<q 22/(1−q11). Finally,
Q  (1/2,1/2) R whenever Q  R.
In Examples 1 and 5, the DM’s preference w.r.t. the informativeness of signals is never
reversed. Examples 2–4 display more complex attitudes to information. In Examples 2
and 3, the DM’s preference w.r.t. the informational content of signals varies with his prior.
In Example 4, he ﬁnds perfect information superior to a certain class of biased signals yet
inferior to another. These examples are stylized descriptions of attitudes to information
that are taken from everyday experience. Introspection suggests that these attitudes may
be a result of DMs’ attempt to attain desired beliefs and avoid undesired beliefs. We will
analyze these examples in detail in Section 5, using the model set forth in this section.
When our DM chooses a signal, he takes into account that he updates his beliefs accord-
ing to Bayes’ rule upon observing the signal’s realization (see Section 6 for a discussion
of this assumption). Thus, for every realization si of the random variable, a signal Q and a
prior p generate a distribution of posterior probabilities on Ω.G i v e np and Q, the posterior






Hence, when a DM with a prior p chooses a signal Q, he effectively chooses a lottery over






and it is drawn with probability
n
i=1piqij.
We may therefore interpret choices of signals at a given prior as a revealed preference
over lotteries on distributions of posterior beliefs. This raises the following question: when94 K. Eliaz, R. Spiegler / Games and Economic Behavior 56 (2006) 87–104
can we rationalize a DM’s pattern of choices over signals by expected-utility preferences
over lotteries on posterior beliefs?
Let u:Δ(Ω) → R be a continuous vNM utility function over posterior beliefs. For













i=1piqij. We interpret U(p,Q) as a representation of the DM’s
preferences over lotteries on posterior beliefs.
Deﬁnition 1. The function u rationalizes the preference proﬁle (p)p∈Δ(Ω) if for every
p ∈ Δ(Ω) and every pair of signals Q,R ∈ Q,
Q p R ⇔ U(p,Q)  U(p,R).
A preference proﬁle (p)p∈Δ(Ω) is said to be rationalizable, if there exists a continuous
vNM utility function that rationalizes this proﬁle.4
The natural benchmark for the model is the EUM agent (Example 5): the DM who max-
imizes expected utility w.r.t. physical outcomes, as if he has no anticipatory feelings. Let
us verify that an EUM agent can be rationalized by expected utility over posterior beliefs.
Let A be the set of actions available to the DM upon observing a signal’s realization. Let







Thus, for every distribution of prior beliefs p and for every signal Q, U(p,Q) is equal to
the DM’s indirect expected utility from physical outcomes when he uses the signal Q.B y
deﬁnition, an EUM agent prefers signal Q to R if and only if Q yields a higher indirect
expected utility than R, i.e., Q p R if and only if U(p,Q)  U(p,R). Note that u is
continuous. It follows that u rationalizes the EUM agent.
Our model is therefore a parsimonious departure from the standard expected utility
framework, in the sense that we only add posterior beliefs as an argument in the utility
function. In any other respect, our model is standard.
Why are beliefs the only argument in the utility function?
In our model, agents only choose signals. We are agnostic as to whether or not they take
some action after observing the signal. The consequence space consists of posterior beliefs
only. Does this entail any loss of generality? We now show that it does not.
4 We allow the prior to be degenerate: pi = 1 for some state ωi. In this case, Bayesian updating requires that
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Recall that in the EUM example, the function u that rationalized the DM’s attitude
towards information was precisely the indirect expected utility function over physical out-
comes. This is a general feature: the utility function over beliefs u can be viewed as the
indirect utility induced by expected utility maximization over an enriched consequence
space, which includes not only beliefs but also states and actions.
Consider an extended model in which the DM has to choose an action a ∈ A after
observing the realization of a signal. A consequence in this model is a triplet (ωi,a,z)
consisting of a state of nature ωi, an action a and a distribution of posterior beliefs z.
Assume the DM has a preference relation over lotteries on this extended consequence such
that there exists a pair of continuous functions f :Ω ×A×Δ(Ω) → R with the following
property: given a distribution of posterior beliefs z, the DM weakly prefers action a to a 













It is easy to see that u is continuous. A DM whose objective is to maximize the expected
value of f (where the expectation is taken w.r.t. z) will choose signals so as to maximize
the expectation of u. Thus, our assumption that only posterior beliefs enter the DM’s vNM
utility function simpliﬁes the analysis and entails no loss of generality.
Analogy to risk attitudes
To better understand our model, it may be useful to draw the following analogy to a
model of decision making under risk.5 Consider the case of n = 2 (two states of nature).
Think of the DM’s prior belief as his “initial wealth” w ∈ W. Similarly, think of the DM’s
posterior belief as his “ﬁnal wealth.” Hence, a signal can be thought of as a fair incremental
lottery, i.e., a lottery with a mean of zero (e.g., a lottery in which a gain of 1000 and a loss
of 1000 have equal probabilities). Thus, given w, the DM can be thought of as having a
preference relation  w over some set of fair incremental lotteries.
The questions we address in this paper are analogous to the following questions. Is
the preference proﬁle ( w)w∈W consistent with maximization of expected utility over the
DM’s ﬁnal wealth? If so, what is the relation between the DM’s attitudes to spread (exhib-
ited by ( w)w∈W at different initial wealth levels w) and the risk attitudes exhibited by his
vNM utility function over ﬁnal wealth? 6
5 For a careful discussion of the analogy between attitudes to information and attitudes to risk (though not in
the context of utility from beliefs), see Grant et al. (1998).
6 We are not aware of existing decision-theoretic models, in which the primitive is a proﬁle of preference
relations over lotteries, such that each preference relation is associated with a different level of initial wealth.96 K. Eliaz, R. Spiegler / Games and Economic Behavior 56 (2006) 87–104
4. A difﬁculty with ordinal utility representation
Recall Akerlof and Dickens’ claim that “people ... manipulate their own beliefs by
selecting sources of information likely to conﬁrm ‘desired’ beliefs.” Bénabou and Tirole
(2002, p. 906) write in a similar vein: “people just like to think of themselves as good,
able, generous, attractive, and conversely ﬁnd it painful to contemplate their failures and
shortcomings.”
Both statements reﬂect the idea that a belief that the state is “good” is more desirable
than the belief that the state is “bad.” Intuitively, agents who differ in what constitutes a
desirable belief for them will also differ in their attitudes toward information. For exam-
ple, let n = 2, and suppose that ω1 and ω2 are states that support left-wing and right-wing
viewpoints, respectively. Consider two news reader, whose well-being is equally affected
by their beliefs, yet for one news reader (a “leftist”) ω1 is a more favorable state than ω2,
while for the other news reader (a “rightist”) ω2 is more favorable than ω1. We expect
them to read different newspapers. In particular, we suspect that they will choose differ-
ently between two partially informative newspapers, one having a right-wing bias and the
other having a left-wing bias, because the two news readers have different notions of what
constitutes “good news.”
Our ﬁrst result in this paper demonstrates that a naïve interpretation of u(1)>u ( 0),
according to which ω1 is a “good state” and ω2 is a “bad state,” cannot be reﬂected in the
DM’s choices of signals. An agent who evaluates ω1 as a good state and ω2 as a bad state
may be indistinguishable from an agent with the opposite evaluation.


















Thus, for any Q,R ∈ Q, V(p,Q)  V(p,R) if and only if U(p,Q)  U(p,R). It follows
that v rationalizes (p)p∈Δ(Ω). 
Corollary 1. Consider a pair of posterior beliefs, z and z , with the property that z assigns
probability one to state ωi, while z  assigns probability one to state ωj  = ωi. Suppose
that u(z)>u ( z ). Then, we can select ci >u ( z) − u(z ) and cj = 0, such that the vNM
function v, deﬁned as in (1), satisﬁes v(z)<v( z ).K. Eliaz, R. Spiegler / Games and Economic Behavior 56 (2006) 87–104 97
This simple result reveals a sense in which the model fails to capture the intuition that
people “select sources of information likely to conﬁrm ‘desired’ beliefs,” to use Akerlof
and Dickens’ terminology. In our model, a distribution of posterior beliefs z is more desir-
able than a distribution z  if u(z)>u ( z ). One may expect two agents 1 and 2, for whom
u1(1,...,0)>u 1(0,...,1) and u2(1,...,0)<u 2(0,...,1), to prefer different sources of
information. However, Corollary 1 shows that the two agents may display the same choices
between signals. Thus, the utility rankings of posterior beliefs are not entirely meaningful,
as far as choices over signals are concerned.
To take an extreme case, let n = 2 and rewrite u as a function of z1 (the posterior
probability of ω1) only. Suppose that u(·) is strictly increasing. Normalize u(·) such that
u(0) = 0. Deﬁne v(z1) = u(z1) − c1z1.L e tc1 = 2maxu (·). It is easy to show that v
is strictly decreasing in z1. Thus, every utility ranking induced by u is reversed by v.
Nevertheless, u and v rationalize the same attitude towards information.
This difﬁculty pertains to the models of K˝ ozsegi (2003) and Caplin and Leahy (2004),
which were described in Section 2. For example, consider a patient who faces the possi-
bility of a terminal disease. He is concerned with his longevity as well as his quality of
life. Suppose that Ω ={ ω1,ω2}, such that ω1 (ω2) is characterized by low (high) longevity
and high (low) quality of life. A priori, an outside observer will be unable to determine
which of the two states is more desirable for the patient. Intuitively, one might believe that
observing the patient’s choice of sources of medical information will resolve this problem.
However, according to the K˝ oszegi and Caplin–Leahy models, a patient who prefers to
believe in ω1 will be behaviorally indistinguishable from a patient who prefers to believe
in ω2, with the opposite preferences, as far as their choices of signals are concerned.
Proposition 1 is a straightforward consequence of the assumption that the DM uses
Bayes’ rule to update his beliefs. In fact, the only feature of Bayes’ rule that is responsible
for the result is the law of iterated expectations: i.e., the mean of zi(p,Q) is pi.T h i s
property implies that the DM’s choices of signals can only reveal how he ranks probability
distributions over posteriors whose mean is equal to his prior. In particular, no choice
between signals can reveal the utility ranking between any distinct posteriors z and z .
5. Failure to explain anomalies
Our second collection of results addresses several real-life examples of anomalous at-
titudes to information, which intuitively seem to be a result of anticipatory feelings. We
ask whether these attitudes can be rationalized by maximization of expected utility from
posterior beliefs.
Examples 2 and 3 of Section 3 describe DMs whose attitudes to information vary with
their prior. In Example 2, when the patient is relatively conﬁdent that he is healthy, he
prefers to be fully informed; but when he is relatively conﬁdent that he is ill, he does not
wish to be fully informed. In Example 3, the DM prefers to be fully informed when he
is relatively conﬁdent about the true state; but when he is less conﬁdent about the true
state, he wishes to remain uninformed. In both cases, although the DM’s attitude to full
information varies with his prior, his attitude to full information is unambiguous when his
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The examples are expressed in terms of a two-state model. The following deﬁnition
captures this property for arbitrary n. Some notation will be useful. First, let the n×n unit
matrix I denote the fully informative signal (qij = 1i fi = j and qij = 0i fi  = j). Second,
for every i = 1,...,n,l e tei ∈ Δ(Ω) denote the degenerate probability distribution that
assigns probability one to ωi. Thus, {e1,...,en} is the set of extreme points in Δ(Ω).
Deﬁnition 2. A preference proﬁle (p)p∈Δ(Ω) satisﬁes uniformity near an extreme prior
(UNEP) if there exists i ∈{ 1,...,n} and a neighborhood Oi of ei, such that either I p Q
for every prior p ∈ Oi and every signal Q,o rQ p I for every prior p ∈ Oi and every
signal Q.
This property means that when the DM is very conﬁdent that some state of the world
is true, he ranks complete information either above or below all other signals. That is, he
does not display preference reversal with respect to complete information when his prior
is close to one of the extreme points in Δ(Ω). Our ﬁrst result in this section shows that if a
DM satisﬁes UNEP, then he cannot satisfy any kind of preference reversal with respect to
complete information.
Proposition 2. Suppose that (p)p∈Δ(Ω) satisﬁes UNEP. Then, either I p Q for every
prior p and signal Q,o rQ p I for every prior p and signal Q.
Proof. By Proposition 1, if the vNM utility function v over posteriors rationalizes
(p)p∈Δ(Ω), then for every real vector (c1,...,cn), the vNM utility function u deﬁned
by u(z) = v(z)−
n
i=1cizi also rationalizes (p)p∈Δ(Ω).L e tci = v(ei). Then, u(ei) = 0
for every i = 1,...,n. It follows that U(p,I) = 0 for every prior p. That is, the DM’s
indirect utility from the fully informative signal can be set to 0, independently of his prior.
Suppose that (p)p∈Δ(Ω) satisﬁes UNEP. Without loss of generality, suppose that for
every prior p that is sufﬁciently close to e2, I p Q for every signal Q. Construct the n×n
signal Q as follows: q11 = 1, and for every i>1, qii = 1 − qi1. Then, for every j>1,








Let x be a non-extremepoint in Δ(Ω). The question is whetherwe can ﬁnd (qii)i=2,...,n,
qii  1, such that zi(p,Q|s1) = xi for every i = 1,...,n. Note that if p1 is sufﬁciently
small relative to p2,...,pn, we can ﬁnd such numbers (qii), such that the system of
equations given by (2) will be satisﬁed. Clearly, there exists a prior p arbitrarily close
to some e2 such that this requirement is met. By assumption, I p Q at this prior p. There-
fore, U(p,I)  U(p,Q). Because U(p,I) = 0, U(p,Q)  0. Because z(p,Q|s1) = x and
z(p,Q|sj) = ej for every j>1, it follows that u(x)  0. But this means that u(x)  0f o r
every x ∈ Δ(Ω). Therefore, for every prior p and every signal Q, I p Q.
By the same reasoning, it can be shown that if for every prior p that is sufﬁciently close
to e2, Q p I for every signal Q, then Q p I for every prior p and every signal Q. K. Eliaz, R. Spiegler / Games and Economic Behavior 56 (2006) 87–104 99
This result states that if a DM has an unambiguous attitude to complete information
when his prior is close to some extreme point, then he must display the same unambiguous
attitude to complete information at any prior. Thus, the model is incapable of accounting
for the anomalous attitudes to information described in Examples 2 and 3.
Proposition 2 does not rule out the rationalizability of the attitude to information de-
picted in Example 4, which also involves a complex attitude to complete information. The
following is another version of the same example. Suppose there are two states, one in
which the political views of the right are correct and another in which the correct views are
those of the left. An agent initially believes that the second state is more likely. The agent’s
decision problem is to choose which newspaper to read. A newspaper with a left-wing bias
reports all the news that validate the left-wing view, but only part of the news that vali-
date the right-wing view. A newspaper with a right-wing bias is similarly deﬁned. The DM
prefers a left-wing biased newspaper to an objective (i.e., fully informative) newspaper,
and he prefers the latter to a newspaper with a right-wing bias.
The following deﬁnition formalizes the behavior described in both versions of Exam-
ple 4. The example is expressed in terms of a model with two states and binary signals (i.e.,
n = m = 2). In this case, generalization to larger n and m makes little sense.
Deﬁnition 3. Let n = m = 2. A preference proﬁle (p)p∈Δ(Ω) displays a preference for















for all α ∈[ α∗,1).
In Example 4, the DM’s preference for a type I error intuitively seems to result from an
attempt to attain desired beliefs (the thesis is of high quality, the left-wing view is correct)
and avoid holding undesired beliefs (the thesis is of low quality, the right-wing view is
correct). The question is whether this intuition can be accommodated into the model of
expected-utility maximization over posterior beliefs.
Proposition 3. A preference proﬁle (p)p∈Δ(Ω) displaying a preference for type I error is
not rationalizable.
Proof. For expositional convenience, let us use the following abbreviated notation: p =
p1, and a signal Q will be represented by the pair (q11,q22). Assume, contrary to the claim,
that there exists α∗ ∈ (0,1) such that for every prior p>1/2w eh a v e(1,α) p (1,1)  p
(α,1) for all α ∈[ α∗,1). By Proposition 1, we can normalize u(0,1) = u(1,0) = 0. Thus,




























By our initial assumption, (1,α) p (1,1)  p (α,1) for all α ∈[ α∗,1). This implies
that u[z(p,(1,α)|s1)] > 0 and u[z(p,(α,1)|s2)] < 0 for all α ∈ (α∗,1). Denote x∗ =
z(p,(1,α∗)|s1). For every α>α ∗, z1(p,(1,α)|s1)>x∗
1. It follows that u(x) > 0 whenever
x∗
1 <x 1 < 1.Observethat limp→1z1(p,(α,1)|s2) = 1.Therefore,wecanchooseaprior p∗
satisfying p∗ ∈ (x∗
1,1), such that z1(p∗,(α∗,1)|s2)>x ∗
1, hence u[z1(p∗,(α∗,1)|s2)] > 0,
a contradiction. 
Why does this result run contrary to our intuition? Recall that the DM in our model is
Bayesian. The posteriors induced by a biased signal of the form (1,α)are (0,1) and some
(z1,z2) with z1 ∈ (p1,1). Reducing α has two effects. First, the probability of the interior
posterior (z1,z2) increases. Second, z1 itself decreases and becomes closer to p1. Thus,
even if u(·) is monotone in z1, increasing the newspaper’s bias has an ambiguous effect
on the DM’s expected utility from posteriors. Our intuitions regarding the anticipatory-
feelings source of preference for type I error seem to reﬂect only the ﬁrst effect.
Propositions 2 and 3 strongly rely on the fact that the posteriors induced by the fully
informativesignal I arealwaysextremepoints,regardlessoftheprior.ByProposition1,we
can set u(ei) = 0 for every i = 1,...,n, such that the DM’s indirect expected utility from
the fully informative signal is constant across all priors. This property greatly restricts the
model’s ability to accommodate preference reversals with respect to complete information.
The lesson from Propositions 2 and 3 is that commonly observed, anomalous attitudes
to information, which seem to be a consequence of anticipatory feelings, cannot be ex-
plained by maximization of expected utility from beliefs. Note that although the model
has difﬁculties in accounting for preference reversals with respect to full information, it is
capable of rationalizing some preference proﬁles that exhibit aversion to information, such
as in the case of Example 1.
Remark 1. Let Ω ={ ω1,ω2} and let u rationalize a preference proﬁle (p)p∈Δ(Ω).I fu is
concave, then the DM is information averse. If u is convex, the DM is information seeking.
Proof. Suppose that u is concave. Consider pair of signals Q and R with qii,rii ∈[ 1/2,1].
Let z ≡ z(p,Q) and z  ≡ z(p,R). In addition, denote by zi(si) and z 
i(si) the posterior
probability of ωi, conditional on the realization si, under each of two signals. Assume
w.l.o.g. that z1(s1)>z 1(s2) and z 
1(s1)>z  
1(s2).I fQ > R, then z1(s1)>z  
1(s1) and
z1(s2)<z  
1(s2). By concavity of u, any convex combination of u[z(s1)] and u[z(s2)] lies
below any convex combination of u[z (s1)] and u[z (s2)]. Hence, U(p,R)  U(p,Q),i m -
plying that R p Q. The case of convex u is handled similarly. 
Remark 1 is not an original result. Recall the analogy drawn at the end of Section 2
between our model and the more familiar literature on risk aversion and attitudes to spread.
An information averse DM in our model is analogous to an agent who always prefers
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if an agent has a concave vNM utility function over his ﬁnal wealth, he has a preference
for smaller spread. Remark 1 is a translation of (a special case of) these results into the
present context. We conclude that the model’s difﬁculty is not in accounting for aversion
to information per se, but in accounting for attitudes to full information that vary with the
prior.
The difﬁculties which we identify in this section arise from our analysis of the DM’s
entire proﬁle of preferences over signals. In other words, we analyze the DM’s attitude to
information at all possible prior beliefs. We have done so because as the examples given
in the Introduction illustrate, many anomalies of interest involve attitudes to information
that vary with the DM’s prior. In contrast, K˝ ozsegi (2003) and Caplin and Leahy (2004)
examine the DM’s behavior for a ﬁxed prior. This is why these papers do not contain
corresponding negative results.
6. How to proceed?
The results of Sections 4 and 5 demonstrate that the extended expected-utility model,
which incorporates the DM’s belief as an argument in his vNM utility function, has great
difﬁculties in accounting for anomalous attitudes to information, as long as one assumes
that the DM’s inferences are Bayesian. First, there is a difﬁculty with ordinal utility rep-
resentation: two agents with opposite rankings of posterior beliefs may choose the same
information sources. This result places severe limits on any “applied” model along these
lines that tries to correlate differences in preferences over beliefs to differences in behavior.
Second,the model turns out to be inconsistent with several real-life examplesof anomalous
attitudes to information, which intuitively seem to result from anticipatory feelings.
In this section, we discuss several ways to proceed from these negative results.
Of course, one way to deal with the negative results is to return to the conventional assump-
tion that people are emotionally neutral towards their beliefs, and to deny that anticipatory
feelings inﬂuence people’s attitudes to information. We disagree with this interpretation of
our results. The notion that people sometimes avoid information because they fear the con-
clusions that it might imply is highly intuitive. The question is how to construct a model
that captures this intuition, given the failure of the model of expected utility from posteriors
coupled with Bayesian updating.
Non-expected utility
All the existing economic models of anticipatory feelings, described in Section 2, as-
sume that the DM has expected-utility preferences over beliefs. We have followed this
practice in this paper. It could be argued that some of the model’s shortcomings can be
overcome by abandoning expected utility in favor of familiar non-expected-utility theo-
ries. However, it is not clear what the criterion for selecting a non-EU functional should
be. Normally, non-EU functionals are motivated by weakenings of the independence ax-
iom, which in turn are motivated by an attempt to capture aspects of decision makers’
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In our model, a ranking of signals at a given prior translates into a ranking of two dis-
tributions of posterior beliefs, via Bayes’ rule. Since Bayes’ rule is non-linear in p and Q,
linearity properties of u do not imply linearity properties of (p)p∈Δ(Ω). An independence
axiom imposed on preferences over probability distributions over posterior beliefs will not
translate into an independence axiom imposed on (p)p∈Δ(Ω). Likewise, we conjecture
that a “weak independence” axiom imposed on preferences over probability distributions
over posterior beliefs will not translate into a “weak independence” axiom imposed on
(p)p∈Δ(Ω). Thus, it is hard to believe that we will be able to provide a convincing axio-
matic justiﬁcation for a familiar non-EU functional.
Prior-dependent utility
It might be argued that the negative results of Section 5 are due to a narrow speciﬁcation
of the consequence space and could be overcome by adding the DM’s prior belief to the
description of a consequence. In this way, a consequence in the choice model would be
a pair consisting of a prior probability p and a posterior probability z, such that u(p,z)
may vary with p. Recall that a key argument in the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 was the
property that U(p,I) = 0 for every prior p. This property ceases to hold when u is also a
function of p.
Note, however, that this extended model does not pass the ordinality test of Section 4.
Also, this extension is vulnerable to an inﬁnite-regress argument, because today’s prior is
yesterday’s posterior. Finally, the extension carries a great loss in explanatory power. Let z
be some posterior belief and let p,p  be two different prior beliefs. No choice experiment
can reveal the ranking between the consequences (p,z) and (p ,z). Therefore, no observ-
able act of choice can reveal the ranking between the DM’s expected utility induced by any
signal at two different priors.
Non-Bayesian updating
Throughout this paper, we assumed that the DM translates signals into probability dis-
tributions over posteriors in accordance with Bayes’ rule. Our analysis relied on abstract
properties of Bayes’ rule (especially the law of iterated expectations). Given the negative
results of Sections 4 and 5, an interesting step forward may be to study utility-over-beliefs
representation of attitudes to information under non-Bayesian updating rules.
The following example illustrates how non-Bayesian updating can reverse some of our
conclusions. Let n = m = 2. For notational convenience, let p1 = p. Let the pair (q11,q22)
represent the signal Q, where q11,q22  1/2. Consider the following updating rule: for
every signal, the DM updates his beliefs as if the signal were (1,1). That is, with proba-
bility pq11 +(1−p)(1−q22) his posterior belief is 1, and with probability p(1−q11)+
(1−p)q22 his posterior is 0. This updating procedure reﬂects the DM’s lack of distinction
between a partially informative signal and a fully informative signal. He regards a partially
informative signal as if it did not have type I and type II errors.
Unlike a Bayesian agent, our DM updates his prior beliefs even when he chooses the
signal (1/2,1/2). Therefore, this signal ceases to be equivalent to acquiring no infor-
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{“no signal”}, where “no signal” means that the DM does not observe any signal and
therefore his posterior belief equals his prior belief.
Let u:[0,1]→R be a continuous increasing function of z1, with u(0) = 0 and
u(1) = 1. It can be shown that for every p ∈ (0,1), there exists a signal (q11,q22) ∈
[1/2,1]2 for which “no signal” ∼p (q11,q22), such that u(p) = pq11 +(1−p)(1−q22).
The implication of this simple result is that u passes the ordinality test. For any pair x,y ∈
(0,1), u(x)  u(y) ifandonlyifthere isa prior p and apairofbinarysignals (q11,q22) and
(r11,r22), such that x = pq11+(1−p)(1−q22), y = pr11+(1−p)(1−r22) and Q p R.
Note that because u(p) is uniquely determined by the signal (q1,q2) for which (q1,q2) ∼p
“no signal”, u is unique up to afﬁne transformations. Thus, given the above non-Bayesian
updating rule, the DM’s preferences over binary signals also reveal the cardinality of u.
This example illustrates how some of the difﬁculties presented in this paper may be
surmounted when we allow for non-Bayesian updating. One may doubt this idea because
it involves two non-standard assumptions: direct utility from beliefs and non-Bayesian
updating. However, the linkage between non-standard effect of beliefs on welfare and non-
Bayesian updating receives some justiﬁcation in Compte and Postlewaite (2005), albeit in
a somewhat different context. They show that if a DM’s belief affects his performance,
then biased inferences from past experiences can enhance his welfare.
Conclusion
The message of this paper is that incorporating decision makers’ beliefs into their util-
ity function raises non-trivial modeling problems. One would like a model of direct utility
from beliefs to account for anomalous attitudes to information which are observed in real-
ity, and seem to result from people’s anticipatory feelings. The model of expected utility
from beliefs with Bayesian updating turns out to be inadequate for this purpose. We have
considered three ways to proceed. We ﬁnd the third way, abandoning Bayesian updat-
ing, to be the most reasonable. If economists allow decision makers in their models to be
emotionally non-neutral towards their beliefs, they should probably also allow them to be
non-Bayesian in their inferences.
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